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Imposing a Duty in an Online World:
Holding The Webhost Liable for
Cyberbullying
by
ELIZABETH M. JAFFE *

Abstract
In light of fettle attempts by state legislatures to subdue the
growing cyberbullying epidemic, the time has come to create a civil
duty upon those who can control the problem—web hosts and
webservers. While the general “foreseeable plaintiff” duty set forth
1
by then-Chief Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
has controlled the duty of care owed to the person of another for the
last century, Judge Andrews’ dissent may hold the key to unlock this
new societal problem: “Every one owes to the world at large the duty
of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the
safety of others. . . . Not only is he wronged to whom harm, might
reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured,
even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger
2
zone.” By imposing a duty to prevent harm upon web hosts and
webservers where cyberbullying harm continues to occur—mainly
Facebook—the law is able to adapt to the new source of harm to
address the growing, unsolved problem.
This article explores the depths of the current liability imposed
upon web hosts and webservers, while advancing that the general tort
duty owed to third parties needs to be expanded to include the

* Associate Professor of Law, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School. Emory University
(B.A., magna cum laude, 1992); Washington University School of Law (J.D., 1995). The
author would like to thank Thomas O. Rainey, IV and Noel Le for their assistance with
this article. This article is dedicated to Michael S. Fineman.
1. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
2. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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aforementioned group. By expanding a duty to prevent cyberbullying
harm upon those who can act—those who have the constitutional
ability to control speech—web hosts and webservers are best
positioned to cure the surmounting issue of online abuse upon the
person of another. At the end, by proactively monitoring, and when
necessary, chilling the private speech of those who inflict the greatest
blows, online hosts such as Facebook not only have the moral duty,
but upon the creation of a legal duty, the obligation to address the
cyberbullying problem. Thus, the cyberbullying issue may be
resolved by revisiting Andrews’ dissenting view that everyone owes a
duty to the person of another to prevent harm from a third person,
including Facebook.
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I. Introduction
3
In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad. Co., Justice Cardozo set
forth the general rule that a defendant only owes a duty to
4
foreseeable plaintiffs. While Cardozo’s “foreseeable plaintiff” rule
has become the standard, Justice Andrews’ dissent in Palsgraf
articulated a contrasting standard to measure civil duties, noting that
“[e]very one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from
5
those acts which unreasonably threaten the safety of others.”
Currently, web hosts are immune from liability for cyberbullying, yet
the they provide the medium through which the cyberbully attacks.
While the thrust of this article does not advocate overturning the long
established principles set forth by Justice Cardozo, perhaps the time

3. Id.
4. Id. at 101.
5. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).

2013]

IMPOSING A DUTY IN AN ONLINE WORLD

279

has come to reconsider Andrews’ dissent and extend liability to the
web host themselves.
It is a well-settled principle in tort law that a defendant does not
have a duty to control the conduct of a third person, such as to
prevent the third person from engaging in conduct that results in
6
harm to a would-be plaintiff. Over time, however, the courts have
carved out various exceptions to this general rule, focusing on the
special relationship between the parties and the control the third
7
party exercises over instruments capable of inflicting harm. In
addition, the formula for imputing civil liability to prevent harm to
the person of another has developed by comparing control with the
foreseeability of harm resulting. Of these exceptions to the general
rule, for the purposes of this discussion, this article focuses on duties
that arise between: the special relationship between the primary
defendant and the third party defendant, the context of a defendant
that permits a third party to use his personal property, and the
relationships where the defendant becomes aware that a third person
intends to harm the victim.
Part I of this article will demonstrate how shifting the cost for
online tort liability between web hosts, third parties, and victims of
injurious content can deter harmful Internet activity. Part II will
show that curbing some kinds of online speech does not impede the
Internet’s potential as a communications medium because not all
speech contributes to the “marketplace of ideas.” Part III will survey
factors that determine and allocate the cost of injurious online
speech, including personal jurisdiction, statutory web host immunity,
and preliminary injunction for online defamation. Part IV will
demonstrate how courts can consider the particular characteristics of
Internet speech while applying the traditional tort of public disclosure
of private facts, as well as the refusal of courts to recognize a form of
negligence online. Finally, Part V concludes with recommendations

6. E.g., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53 (W. Page Keeton et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1984) (“But it should be recognized that ‘duty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but is
only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to
say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.”).
7. “The rule that you are to love your neighbor becomes in law, you must not injure
your neighbor; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbor? receives a restricted reply.
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbor. Who, then, in law is my neighbor? The
answer seems to be—persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in questions.” Id. (quoting Donoghue v.
Stevenson, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883)).
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on how to make the cost of online tort claims more equitable between
third parties, victims, and web hosts.

II. Web host Liability:
The Law and Economics of Online Tort Claims
Over the last decade, the Internet has become a new frontier,
replacing traditional notions of means of communicating, sharing
8
information, and fostering relationships. Despite the advancements
the modern digital world has had on society as a whole, unfettered
and unrestricted access produces not only healthy, but injurious
9
exchanges. The ability to communicate digitally and anonymously
has fostered an online-world where accountability for one’s
10
Specifically, the
comments and statements has disappeared.
11
cyberbully epidemic has not only consumed the news media and
12
13
political agendas, but legal scholars have also joined in the debate.
Yet the question remains as to who should bear the duty to prevent
and control cyberbullying.
Similar to public parks, street corners, and courthouse steps, the
protections afforded by the First Amendment limit the extent of
14
government regulation of online speech. But private web hosts are
free to limit the manner, mode, and method of online speech. Web

8. Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? A
Public Lecture and Symposium on Michael J. Sandel’s Recent Book, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435,
1444 (2011) (advancing “[o]nline activity can facilitate civic engagement and political
participation”).
9. Id. at 1438.
10. Id. at 1447–48.
11. E.g., Gracie Bonds Staples, Cobb middle school student files suit alleging
cyberbullying, ATLANTA J. CONST., (Apr. 27, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://www.ajc.com/news/
news/local/cobb-middle-school-student-files-suit-alleging-cyb/nQTMb/; Anderson Cooper,
Video: Holding Teen Bullies Accountable, CNN, (Sept. 28, 2011, 3:00 PM),
http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/28/video-holding-teen-bullies-accountable/.
12. See generally NAT’L CON. OF STATE LEG., Cyberbullying, Cyberbullying Enacted
Legislation: 2006-2010, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/cyberbullying.aspx (listing
cyberbullying legislation enacted by the individual states).
13. E.g., Joe Dryden, It’s a Matter of Life and Death: Judicial Support for School
Authority Over Off-Campus Student Cyber Bullying and Harassment, 33 U. LA VERNE L.
REV. 171 (2012); Jamie Wolf, Note, The Playground Bully has Gone Digital: The Dangers
of Cyberbullying, the First Amendment Implications, and the Necessary Responses, 10
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 575, 576 (2012).
14. William H. Freivogel, Does the Communications Decency Act Foster Indecency?,
16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 17, 39 (2011).
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services providers like Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! have the
ability to leverage content created by third parties. For example, a
private Internet service provider can pre-screen speech or remove
speech from the web—actions which would not pass muster if
engaged in by any state actor. As such, a tradeoff of the private
business of providing Internet service enables these private actors to
address harmful content as a cost of doing business. But absent an
incentive—or a duty—to act, these private individuals are free to
make discretionary judgments regarding what speech they will allow
and what speech they will chill.

III. The Nature of Online Speech
Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized that “the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out . . . It is an experiment, as all life is an
15
experiment.” This test has become known as the marketplace of
16
But in the context of cyberbullying, should the
ideas theory.
marketplace control the truth? One method for controlling behavior
is to raise the cost associated with pursuing the activity associated
17
with the behavior. As such, recent judicial activity suggests courts
are able to influence the demand for wrongful online activity by
raising the cost for third parties and by encouraging web hosts and
18
web servers to take—or forgo—certain actions.
A. Personal Jurisdiction

As with any civil action, personal jurisdiction is the threshold
issue, and as applied to online tort claims, a critical issue arises
19
because of the multi-jurisdictional nature of online speech. Due to
personal jurisdiction functioning as a gatekeeper in civil litigation,
reform of personal jurisdiction issues may deter the creation of
15. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
16. Id.
17. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 140, 278 (Vicki Been et al.
eds., 8th ed. 2011).
18. See Discussion infra. [this FN should refer to a specific section, even if it’s this
section –MT]
19. E.g., Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus
Punishment, 85 IND.. L.J. 1113 (2010).
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wrongful online content. While outside the scope of this discussion,
the personal jurisdiction bearer is an important issue because defining
the means of how an aggrieved party is able to seek redress helps to
define the actions that are necessary of third parties (like web hosts)
to prevent harm.

B. Webhost Liability Under the Communication Decency Act

The Communication Decency Act (“CDA”) provides immunity
from liability for providers and users of online services who publish
20
According to Professor Mark
information provided by others.
Lemley, tort immunity for web hosts exists only in the early judicial
21
In fact, Lemley
interpretation of section 230(c) of the CDA.
discovered that courts apply no other statute as a shield of absolute
22
immunity for web hosts and webservers.
Moreover, no other statute has been interpreted by courts to
23
confer absolute immunity for web hosts. After its inception, courts
interpreting the CDA’s safe harbor granted web sites absolute
immunity, harboring them from liability even after receiving notice of

20. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
21. Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 101, 112 (2007). See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006):
(c) Protection for “good samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive
material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of-(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).
22. Lemley, supra note 21, at 112.
23. Id.
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wrongful content if they failed or refused to remove the content at
24
issue. One research article stated:
Congress recognized that websites could not feasibly
monitor the accuracy of the huge volume of information
that their users may choose to post. If the law permitted
an angry plaintiff to hold a website liable for information
that the website did not create, such liability would stifle
free speech as fewer and fewer sites would be willing to
permit users to post anything at all. Xcentric Ventures,
LLC, which operates the website Ripoff Report, one of
the websites most frequently sued for defamation, has
successfully defended more than twenty lawsuits because
25
of the safe harbor provisions in the CDA.
Judicial interpretation of the safe harbor provision after passage
of the Act is relatively broad compared to the Congressional intent in
26
According to Lemley, by
drafting the safe harbor provision.
rendering section 230 of the CDA as providing web hosts absolute
immunity, web hosts were left with no incentive to exercise control
27
over third party content. As such, the effect of granting web hosts
absolute immunity under the CDA distorts the economic incentives
Congress meant to confer to web hosts—as opposed to encouraging
web hosts to enforce terms of use, absolute immunity induces web
28
hosts to turn a blind eye to obvious and foreseeable harms.
29
In theory, section 230 of the CDA serves an economizing
function by immunizing web hosts from liability for content created
24. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Ben Ezra, Weinstein
& Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d
465 (3d Cir. 2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
25. Kraig J. Marton et al., Protecting One’s Reputation—How To Clear A Name In A
World Where Name Calling Is So Easy, 4 PHOENIX L. REV 53, 63 (2010).
26. Lemley, supra note 21, at 112.
27. Id. at 112–13.
28. Id. at 113.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (West 2006). Protection for “good samaritan” blocking and
screening of offensive material:
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of--
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by third parties. 30 But without such immunity, web hosts face
prohibitive costs in maintaining online services open to millions of
31
Internet users. Despite this, lawmakers and courts were not always
clear on how to provide web hosts with the incentive to operate on
the mainstream Internet, while simultaneously addressing any
32
harmful content created by third parties. As case law interpreting
section 230 of the CDA developed, courts learned that granting
absolute immunity may have the very opposite effect of giving web
hosts the incentive to police their sites that Congress had hoped for in
33
passing the CDA. While the theoretical role of web host immunity
34
is straightforward, the extent of optimal immunity was not.
In a perfect world, the right level of immunity serves the interest
35
of web hosts, third parties and potential victims concurrently. One
possible means to strike a balance between all parties, and serve
36
greater public good, is through qualified immunity.
Prior to the CDA, the New York Supreme Court decided in
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services that a web service could be held
liable when it failed to take down content created by a third party
because the web service monitored content from third parties and
37
claimed it would delete content that violated its terms of service.
Congress enacted the CDA in 1996 in part to overturn the Stratton
38
opinion.

(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).
30. See Freivogel, supra note 14, at 45.
31. Id.
32. See 141 CONG. REC. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement by Rep. Cox)
(without absolute immunity web hosts would discard terms of service to avoid liability
altogether, thereby allowing third parties to publishing anything on their web sites). See
also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
668 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding limited immunity, rather than absolute immunity, will induce
web hosts to be accountable for harmful content created by third parties).
33. Lemley, supra note 21, at 113.
34. Id. at 102 (describing safe harbors that grant absolute and partial immunity).
35. See id. at 101–02.
36. Id. at 113.
37. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Corp, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 25, 1995).
38. 141 Cong. Rec. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement by Rep. Cox).
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The Stratton decision provided part of the impetus for
Section 230; Congress worried that the decision would
discourage online computer services
from
removing
obscene content from their sites because they would
conclude that the only way to avoid publisher liability was
to eschew responsibility and allow everything to be
posted. So Stratton threatened both to open the door to
indecency and to interfere with the robustness of the fast
39
developing Internet.
In one of the first interpretations of the CDA safe harbor in 1997,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted
the CDA in Zeran v. America Online as giving the webhost absolute
immunity: Section 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of
action that would make service providers liable for information
40
originating with a third-party user of the service.” The Zeran court
rationalized this conclusion in economic terms, holding “it would be
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of
41
postings for possible problems.”
For a decade following Zeran, federal courts followed suit in
applying CDA section 230 as conferring absolute immunity for web
42
hosts for content created by third parties. In 2002, Congress issued
the Committee Report to the Dot Kids Implementation and
43
Efficiency Act, in which it approved of the Zeran line of cases.
Professor Mark Lemley asserts that the absolute immunity under
the CDA granted by the Zeran court would result in more harm than
44
good.
ISPs have no incentive to police their sites even for
content that obviously does not belong there, or to take
down even material that is clearly false or injurious. Nor
are they even obligated to aid the plaintiff in finding the
wrongdoer by disclosing the identity of their clients. As a
39. Freivogel, supra note 14 at 21–22.
40. Zeran , 129 F.3d at 330.
41. Id. at 331.
42. See Universal Commc’n. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007); Almeida
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d 980.
43. H.R. REP. No. 107-449 at 13 (2002) (stating “courts have correctly interpreted
section 230(c)”).
44. Lemley, supra note 21 at 113–14.
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result, absolute immunity may lead to plaintiffs being
unable to remove objectionable material or to find the
tortfeasor in order to recover damages from her, and
therefore remaining uncompensated even for egregious
45
harms.
Zeran protected the web host from traditional secondary liability,
and appeared to create an Internet specific form of tort immunity that
46
did not exist outside the Internet. Even before the Zeran decision in
1997, Judge Frank Easterbrook expressed doubts on such an
approach to online liability.
Judge Easterbrook’s skepticism about the Zeran approach
may have been foreshadowed in a talk in 1996 at the
University of Chicago. Judge Easterbrook taught there
earlier in his career and was a prominent advocate of a
law and economics school of thought that favors legal
solutions consistent with free market realities. In his 1996
talk, Judge Easterbrook recalled that a former dean of the
University of Chicago Law School, Gerhard Casper, had
once remarked that the school didn’t have a course on
“The Law of the Horse.” By this, Casper meant that a lot
of cases deal with horses—people kicked by horses,
licensing race horses, veterinarian care of horses, prizes at
horse shows—but it would be absurd to teach a course on
the law of the horse. The same is true for cyberspace,
Judge Easterbrook said. It would be better for judges to
develop a sound set of laws for intellectual property and
47
then apply them to cyberspace, he said.
In recent years, courts departed from the early line of CDA
48
section 230 cases granting web hosts absolute immunity. In Jones v.
Dirty World Entertainment, one federal district court determined that
49
web host immunity is not absolute. Web hosts fall outside the reach
of the CDA’s safe harbor when they no longer act as passive hosts by

45. Id. at 113.
46. E.g., Joseph Monaghan, Social Networking Websites’ Liability For User Illegality,
21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 499, 505 (2011).
47. Freivogel, supra note 14, at 25.
48. See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t, 840 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1011 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
49. Id. at 1009.
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encouraging and soliciting wrongful content from third parties or
50
creating such content. In Jones, Sarah Jones, a Cincinnati Bengals
cheerleader and part time teacher, sued the operator of thedirty.com
for state law claims of defamation and invasion of privacy for content
posted by a third party that she argued the site encouraged and
51
therefore rendered itself in part liable. Owners of thedirty.com,
Dirty World Entertainment, filed a motion for judgment as a matter
52
of law for absolute immunity under the CDA. The Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed the motion for
53
judgment as a matter of law. The court ruled that CDA section 230
immunity is not absolute, and only applies when the webhost is not
“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of”
54
the offending content.
In departing from the Zeran line of cases, the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky cited persuasive authority
from the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals in finding Dirty
55
World outside the reach of the CDA’s safe harbor for web hosts.
Relying on Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
56
57
Roommates.com, and Federal Trade Commission v. Accusearch,
the Jones court determined that a web host is not immune from tort
liability under the CDA if the host takes action beyond that of a
58
passive service provider. The web host can become responsible for
offensive content by specifically encouraging or soliciting wrongful
59
content. Immunity for web hosts under the CDA, however, is not
60
Applying the principles from the Ninth and Tenth
absolute.
Circuits, the court found that Dirty World “specifically encourag[ed]”
61
development of the wrongful content. The facts cited by the court in
finding Dirty World as a non-passive web host that encouraged or
helped develop wrongful content include the site’s name, the editor’s
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Jane Doe v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 2010 WL 4018629 (E.D.
Ky. 2010).
53. Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1009.
54. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2006).
55. Jones, F.Supp.2d at 1011.
56. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157
(9th Cir. 2008).
57. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
58. Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1011.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1012.
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discretion in removing content after notification from the plaintiff,
the editor’s own comments on postings made by third parties, and the
editor’s interactions with third parties regarding the wrongful
62
content.
A law and economics perspective of the District Court’s denial of
Dirty World’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under the CDA
considers the opinion’s effect on webhost’s conduct. The CDA’s
qualified safe harbor, as interpreted in Jones, serves an economizing
function. Victims of tortious online content face steep costs in
63
pursuing private settlement. Perpetrators are often anonymous and
64
unwilling parties. When costs are prohibitive in the market, the next
65
recourse is litigation. In litigation, the ability of victims to claim
against web hosts increases their chances to collect court judgments,
while pursuing private third parties could only render awards dwarfed
66
by the cost of litigation. In online tort suits, the plaintiff has
incentives to pursue big-pocketed web sites rather than unwilling,
67
individual parties who may not be able to fulfill judgment awards.
Providing web hosts absolute immunity under the CDA is not socially
optimal when those web entities have a financial incentive to host
68
wrongful content, yet are immune regardless of their conduct.
The CDA’s safe harbor provision is the functional equivalent of a
subsidy to web hosts from Internet users, decreasing the costs for web
hosts to publish without need for pre-publication verification of
content for accuracy and other legal compliance. 69 The subsidy
quickens online publishing, allowing web hosts to take advantage of
instantaneous Internet communications. In legal terms, the CDA’s
limited safe harbor is simply an issue of proximate cause. 70 In
economic terms, removing safe harbor protection is a way for courts
to cancel the subsidy that injured Internet users pay to web hosts and

62. Id.
63. See Who Pays for Tort Liability Claims?, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISORS (Apr, 2002), available at http://www.policyalmanac.org
/economic/archive/ torts.shtml (last visited August 20, 2012).
64. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield For Scoundrels: An Empirical Study
Of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 Of The Communications Decency Act, 43
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 486 (2010).
65. POSNER, supra note 17, at 935.
66. See Ardia, supra note 64, at 486.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 936
70. See id.
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make web hosts internalize the externalities of their actions. 71 In
essence, courts are saying to web hosts—don’t look a gift horse in the
mouth. Publishers who allow or incite others to produce harmful
content create externalities that provide an economic argument for
72
Providing private parties actionable claims
speech regulation.
against web hosts for publishing harmful content about them reduces
the demand, and hence the incentives, for the publishing of such
73
content. Contributory liability for web hosts from content authored
74
by private parties may reduce the cost of online tort enforcement.
As such, to not allow private parties to make tort claims against web
hosts equates to making Internet use an assumption of risk, which
would deter Internet use and render the Internet’s communications
75
capabilities less valuable.
The Jones court’s reliance on persuasive authority from other
circuits is salient. Even though tort claims for invasion of privacy,
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress reside in
state law, interpretation of the CDA is a matter of federal law,
rendering precedent in one circuit susceptible to serve as persuasive
76
authority in other federal circuits. In the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal, facts that determined the outcome of
the CDA safe harbor analysis may render interactive sites liable
77
under section 230 qualified immunity. But in the Third and Fourth
78
Circuits, web hosts may still enjoy absolute immunity.
C. Judicial Trend Away From Absolute Immunity

The basis for the gradual trend away from reading CDA section
230 as providing web hosts with absolute immunity finds its roots in
the realization of economic incentives resulting from such an
71. See id.
72. Id. at 937.
73. Id. at 936.
74. See id.
75. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 670 (stating “to appreciate the limited role of § 230,
remember that ‘information content providers’ may be liable for contributory
infringement if their system is designed to help people steal music or other material in
copyright”)
76. See Jones, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1011.
77. E.g., Smith, 333 F.3d 1018; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157; Accusearch, 570 F.3d
1187; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d 980. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit may not extend absolute
immunity under CDA § 230. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at669.
78. See Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d at 327; Green, 318 F.3d at 465.
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interpretation of the CDA. 79 In Doe v. GTE Corp., Judge Frank
Easterbrook recognized that absolute immunity induces web hosts
“to take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity” under the
80
CDA. Judge Easterbrook noted that the incentives provided by
absolute immunity conflict with the basis of the CDA: “[T]he
‘Communications Decency Act’ bears the title ‘Protection for “Good
Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material,’ hardly an
apt description if its principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing
about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their
81
services.”
Along these same lines, in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee For Civil
Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Judge Easterbrook reiterated that the
CDA “as a whole cannot be understood as a general prohibition of
82
civil liability for web-site operators and other online content hosts.”
Easterbrook suggested that a web host “causing a particular
statement to be made” or causing the injurious “content of a
83
statement” might render that web host susceptible to liability. In
causing particular statements or the injurious content of statements,
84
Legal commentators
web hosts become vulnerable to liability.
praised Easterbrook’s approach to the CDA:
Judge Easterbrook’s interpretation of Section 230
persuasively demonstrates that Zeran has interpreted the
law in a way that provides computer services little
incentive to monitor their sites for offensive content. As a
result, Judge Easterbrook is correct in arguing that in this
way the Zeran interpretation is contrary to the title and
85
purpose of the law.
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com interpreted CDA
section 230 with the background of the Seventh Circuit’s dicta in
86
Roommates.com concerned an
GTE and Craigslist “in mind.”
online roommate-matching website that allowed visitors to choose
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir 2003).
Id. at 660.
Id.
Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669.
Id. at 671–72.
Id. at 670.
Freivogel, supra note 14, at 28.
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164.
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from drop down menus criteria for roommates, which may violate the
87
Applying the Craigslist analysis of
federal Fair Housing Act.
causation and distinction between direct and third party content
providers, the Roommates.com court determined that the defendant
“created” discriminatory questions and choice of answers, and
88
“designed” its website registration around them. Roommates.com’s
actions in causing the injurious content rendered it an “information
89
content provider.” The Roommates.com court found that section
230 “provides immunity only if the interactive computer service does
90
not “creat[e] or develop[ ] the information “in whole or in part.”
The nexus between “causation” and the designation of
roommates.com rendering itself an “information content provider”
91
was salient. The Craigslist court stated: “The critical question is
whether Roommates.com is itself an “information content provider,”
such that it cannot claim that the information at issue was “provided
by another information content provider.” In other words, the court
decided that roommates.com fell out of reach of the section 230
immunity by no longer acting as a passive content publisher and
becoming a content provider itself rather than relaying information
92
from third party information content providers. According to the
Court, this interpretation of the CDA comported with the initial
economic basis of the CDA rather than early judicial interpretation of
the statute:
In passing section 230, Congress sought to spare
interactive computer services . . . to perform some editing
on user-generated content without thereby becoming
liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages
that they didn’t edit or delete. In other words, “Congress
sought to immunize the removal of user-generated
93
content, not the creation of content.”
This reading of the CDA is contrary to that in Zeran, which found
that the CDA immunized web hosts from any kind of liability from

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Id. at 1166 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).
Id. at 1181–82.
Id. at 1166.
Id. at 1163 (emphasis in original).
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third party content by not distinguishing between content creation
94
and content removal.
In Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the
Court’s decision in Roommates.com, adopting both the causation and
95
“content provider” aspects of the Roommates.com decision.
Accusearch concerned a web host who collected and sold confidential
information to third parties, including private phone records, the
acquisition of which could violate the Telecommunications Act or
96
Applying the holding from
circumvent it by fraud or theft.
Roommates.com, the Accusearch court determined that the web host
“solicited” requests for confidential information protected by law and
“knew” the information would be obtained through “fraud or
97
illegality.” Further, the court determined that offensive postings
resulting from the wrongful collection of confidential information was
98
Accusearch’s raison d’etre. The Accusearch decision incorporated
the Court’s analysis from Roommates.com by focusing on the
causation inquiry. The Accusearch court stated the immunity for the
defendant hinged on whether the web host was “responsible for the
development of the specific content that was the source of the alleged
99
liability.” If the web host defendant was responsible as the cause for
the injurious content, the web host becomes an information content
provider in his own right: “an information content provider of certain
content is not immune from liability arising from publication of that
100
content.”
Limitations to web host immunity under the CDA may arise
101
through creative legal arguments. In Barnes v. Yahoo!, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed negligent undertaking and
promissory estoppel claims in a case where an ex-boyfriend created a
102
The profile included
fake Yahoo! profile of the victim, Barnes.
103
intimate photos, private information and a fake solicitation for sex.
After several failed attempts to contact Yahoo! by mail to take down
the profile, a Director of Communications for Yahoo! contacted

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1164.
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at1197.
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1157; see also Accusearch, 570 F.3d at1191–92.
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199.
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1198.
Id. at 1187.
See Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1098.
Id.
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Barnes and asked the victim to fax Yahoo! a copy of the letters. In
reponse, the Yahoo! director told the victim she would “personally
walk the statements over to the division responsible for stopping
104
unauthorized profiles and they would take care of it.” The victim
relied on these statements and took no further action to remove the
105
Notwithstanding this representation by the director at
profiles.
Yahoo!, the profile remained in place for two months until the
106
initiation of the suit against Yahoo!.
In Barnes, the court rejected the victim’s argument on the
negligent undertaking claim by noting that receiving notice of the
injurious content and by initiating steps to remove that content,
Yahoo! acted “not as a publisher, but rather as one who undertook to
107
Under this theory,
perform a service and did it negligently.”
Yahoo! would be liable not for publishing or failing to take down the
content, but for initiating but withdrawing from its undertaking to
108
As Yahoo! would not be held liable as a
remove the content.
publisher, the CDA’s section 230 safe harbor would not protect the
109
web host. The court squarely rejected this theory noting:
We are not persuaded. As we implied above, a plaintiff
cannot sue someone for publishing third-party content
simply by changing the name of the theory from
defamation to negligence. Nor can he or she escape
section 230(c) by labeling as a “negligent undertaking” an
action that is quintessentially that of a publisher. The
word “undertaking,” after all, is meaningless without the
following verb. That is, one does not merely undertake;
one undertakes to do something. And what is the
undertaking that Barnes alleges Yahoo failed to perform
with due care? The removal of the indecent profiles that
her former boyfriend posted on Yahoo’s website. But
removing content is something publishers do, and to
impose liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily
involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the
110
content it failed to remove.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1099
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1102.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1102–03.
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While the Barnes court rejected the negligent undertaking claim
as merely rephrasing arguments under different legal doctrines, it
distinguished the promissory claim as standing on sufficiently
independent grounds: “liability for breach of promise is different
from, and not merely a rephrasing of, liability for negligent
111
undertaking.”
On the promissory estoppel claim, the victim referred to Yahoo!’s
“promise” to address the situation and the fact that this promise
112
caused “reliance” that created “detriment.” The court construed
the victim’s language as alleging a cause of action for promissory
estoppel under section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
113
The Court determined that the victim, through her
Contracts.
promissory estoppel claim, sought to hold Yahoo! liable as a promisor
who breached contract rather than as a publisher of third party
114
content. The court defined the promisor obligation of Yahoo! as
arising when Yahoo! made a promise it intended, actually or
constructively, to induce reliance by Barnes that the fake profile
115
created by her ex-boyfriend would be taken down.
The promissory estoppel holding in Barnes by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals simply allowed the victim to survive a motion to
116
The court was careful to address why the
dismiss by Yahoo!.
promissory estoppel claim could survive while the negligent
undertaking claim could not. The court also limited its holding,
117
stating that it “cannot simply infer a promise” to take down content.
118
Hence, a
Such promises must “be as clear and well defined.”
“general monitoring policy, or even an attempt to help a particular
person, on the part of an interactive computer service such as Yahoo!
119
Therefore, a web host
does not suffice for contract liability.”
making general statements about take downs in a terms of service
provision may not necessarily be making a promise sufficient for a
120
claim of promissory estoppel. Further, web hosts like Yahoo! can

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1099.
Id.
Id. at 1107.
Id. at 1107–08.
Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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simply disclaim their intention not to be bound in terms of service
121
provisions on take downs and avoid a promissory estoppel claim.
The trend away from absolute immunity for web hosts under
section 230 of the CDA originated in the 2003 Seventh Circuit’s dicta
122
This trend continued in other circuits. Specifically, in
in GTE.
123
2008, the Seventh Circuit reiterated dicta in Craigslist, that was later
adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals holding in
124
Roommates.com, which was readopted in the 2009 holding by the
125
Tenth Circuit in Accusearch. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decisions in GTE and Craigslist formulated rules qualifying immunity
under CDA section 230, however, the facts in those cases did not
render the defendant web hosts liable even without absolute
126
immunity. Yet, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of CDA section
230 as providing only qualified immunity became part of the essential
holdings in Roommates.com and Accusearch due to the facts in those
127
Had facts similar to those in Roommates.com and
cases.
Accusearch been present before the Seventh Circuit in GTE and
Craigslist, those cases may well have turned out differently, with
128
liability against the web hosts. In view of this history of a chain
reaction among the federal circuits of interpreting only qualified
immunity for web hosts under the CDA, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Barnes suggests that web hosts may begin to face liability as these
129
cases permeate through the courts.
Despite court decisions supporting the rights of victims, the broad
sweep of qualified immunity for web hosts under the CDA suggests
that courts have interpreted the statute to supersede traditional
130
Under the
secondary liability analysis under proximate cause.
traditional analysis, entities can incur liability for “knowledge of,
promotion of, refraining to control, or profiting from illegal
131
activity.” Interestingly, the profiting of web activity for monetary

121. Id.
122. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660.
123. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669.
124. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164.
125. Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1198.
126. Compare GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660; with Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669.
127. See, e.g., id.
128. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660; Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d
at 1164; Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1198.
129. See Barnes, 570 F.3d 1096.
130. Monaghan, supra note 46, at 506.
131. Id.
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gain may invoke personal jurisdiction for a web host in a foreign
forum yet not allow victims to claim tort actions against the web host.
The court in Jones wrote:
The facts alleged here indicate that Dirty World, LLC,
through thedirty.com, intentionally reaches beyond the
boundaries of its home state to conduct business and
interact with residents of other states. It is a fair
assumption that the defendants are not in this business as
a hobby, but rather to make money, as do most web sites,
by advertising. The defendants publish invidious and
salacious posts by visitors to the web site (known on the
site as “THE DIRTY ARMY”), they respond to those
posts with their own comments, and they thereby
encourage and generate further posts by readers. In effect,
a dialogue is created. It is also a fair inference that the
salacious posts will invite hits from residents of the region
132
where the subject of the posts lives and/or works.
Interpretations of the CDA, even decisions taking contrary views
on absolute and qualified immunity, protect web hosts from
133
traditional secondary liability. Under secondary liability analysis,
web hosts would be liable if they served as the proximate cause under
134
One commentator compared the
common law tort analysis.
language of the CDA and found it consistent with court decisions
finding secondary liability in non-Internet cases and Internet cases
involving intellectual property (which is statutorily exempt under
135
CDA section 230(c)’s safe harbor provision).

132. Jones, 766 F.Supp.2d 828, 833 (E.D. Ky. 2011)
133. Monaghan, supra note 46 at 507.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 533 n.46. Compare § 230(c)(2) (“No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held [civilly] liable on account of ... (A) any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”); with Fonovisa,
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding operators of a swap
meet liable where they allowed vendors to sell counterfeit goods and they had knowledge
of, control of, and profited from the infringing activity); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 938, 941 (2005) (holding plaintiffs liable because they knew their
software was used for copyright infringement, they promoted its use for copyright
infringement, did not attempt to prevent the infringement, and profited from their users’
copyright infringement).
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Web hosts are immune to tort liability when they simply refuse to
136
remove online content even after notification from victims. Even
after notification of injurious content, immunity enables web hosts to
137
As such, this
ignore patently unlawful speech with impunity.
immunity for web hosts under the CDA contrasts with the take down
rules of the DMCA, which sets out takedown procedures for web
138
hosts following notice of content that infringes a copyright. The
CDA does not preempt the DMCA, but preempts tort laws such as
139
defamation and privacy. Further, web hosts do not incur liability
after notification that injurious content violates their own privacy
140
policies and terms of use. Social networking sites like Facebook
and MySpace have various schemes that allow users to report
injurious content. But the effectiveness of these reporting schemes is
questionable if the sites face no liability when they fail to take
141
action.

IV. Online Tort Claims
The internet magnifies the importance of lowering costs for
victims because the free nature of publication online enables injurious
142
activity at little to no cost to the wrongdoer. Further complicating
the problem is the fact that pursuing claims for online tort actions can
be costly. These costs not only affect an aggrieved party’s ability to
143
file suit, but are also considered by web hosts when drafting user
144
agreements. Moreover, seeking recovery for an online tort can be a
costly and time consuming process. To add to this difficulty, as much
as forty-one percent of Internet tort claims involve anonymous

136. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103; Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478
F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007).
137. See id.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
139. See id.
140. See Terence J. Lau, Towards Zero Net Presence, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 237, 269 (2011).
141. Monaghan, supra note 46 at 526–27.
142. Marton, supra note 25, at 60.
143. See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social
Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261 (2010) (arguing for the
refinement of judicial common law as a beneficial way for online victims to seek redress).
144. See genearlly Allyson W. Haynes, Virtual Blinds: Finding Online Privacy in
Offline Precedents, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603 (2012) (proposing solutions for
online privacy disputes by incorporating user agreements that benefit all parties).
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content and users. 145 As such, what is the best way to curb this going
concern? This part will explore the effectiveness of the claims of
defamation, invasion of privacy based on a public disclosure of
private facts, and refusing to remove injurious content after
publication, as these claims have become a great concern in the
context of Internet-based torts as opposed to their usage in traditional
146
mediums.
A. Defamation

The law of defamation treats the written word more harshly than
the spoken word. Based on the nature of libelous acts, as compared
to slander, libel is a more deliberate activity—there is more time to
contemplate what one memorializes on paper or online, as opposed
to speaking the same harmful content. Hence, in liability for libel, as
set forth in Jones, there is less of a danger involved in deterring
socially valuable communications than there is in imposing liability
for slander. By way of comparison, as discussed above, personal
jurisdiction and CDA immunity for web hosts’ jurisprudence involves
claims for defamation.
Despite the courts treating personal
jurisdiction over Internet claims in a favorable light with regard to
victims of online defamation, the viability of any defamation action
expanded only after courts removed the absolute immunity for web
hosts. Currently, the CDA’s absolute immunity may be the highest
obstacle to transferring defamation to the Internet environment. This
begs the question: Should any web host immunity exist?
The relationship between defamation claims and the CDA
illustrates a function of economic incentives. Prior to the CDA, web
hosts bore the cost of injurious third party content entirely because
the potential for harm was endless. With the passing of CDA section
230, Congress—in theory—sought to remove this burden for web
hosts, while intending to encourage the hosts to enforce online terms
147
of use without fear of liability. This new burden threatened not
only the potential growth of online services, but also the development
of Internet technologies. Shortly after codification, courts interpreted
section 230 to grant absolute immunity to web hosts, thereby passing

145. Marton, supra note 25, at 60; Ardia, supra note 64 at 487.
146. See generally Ardia, supra note 143 at 261.
147. See generally David Lukmire, Can Courts Tame the Communications Decency
Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371,
373–85 (2010) (outlining the legislative history of the CDA).
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the cost of injurious online content onto the victims. 148 These early
rulings imposed steep costs on victims who were required to locate
the third parties who created content, while leaving the web hosts
shielded from liability. The effect of these initial rulings resulted in
the victims becoming the subsidizers of both third parties engaged in
defamatory acts and the web hosts that not only provided the medium
for the harm to occur, but continued to publish the defamatory
content.
As such, absent regulation of web hosts under the CDA, there is
no incentive to absorb the cost of policing online content or taking
affirmative steps to prevent the harm from occurring in the first
149
place.
B. Invasion of Privacy – Public Disclosure of Private Facts

William Prosser outlines the four basic rights of privacy to
include: intrusion; disclosure of private facts; false light; and
150
appropriation of name or likeness. Following Prosser’s lead, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted this basic outline for
individual privacy rights. At the inception of the Internet and online
interactions, courts applied these four basic rights, construing online
activity to mirror offline tortious conduct. Over time, however, courts
have either abridged or effectively discarded the privacy tort of public
disclosure of private facts. In fact, the Supreme Court of the United
States has all but rendered this tort a nullity. To that end, scholars
cite the need to strengthen the tort for disclosure of private facts to
meet news dangers to privacy posed by online content and
interactions. Yet, what is puzzling about this sequence of events is
that the privacy tort for disclosure of private facts provides the very
foundation for many civil and criminal statutes.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 652D set forth the
privacy tort for public disclosure of private facts:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another is subject to liability to the other for

148. Lemley, supra note 21, at 112.
149. E.g., Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L.
REV. 41, 45 (1998) (stating that intentional and unintentional communication are widely
available to “a vast number of people”).
150. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
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invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind
that: (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
151
and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
In jurisdictions applying section 652D, courts separate the tort of
public disclosure of private facts into four parts: (1) publicity given to
a matter that; (2) concerns the private life of another; (3) the matter
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (4) is not of
152
legitimate public concern.
Under the Restatement (Second), “publicity” entails
communicating a matter in such a way as to make it available to the
153
public at large rather than merely a few individuals. With regard to
online content, information posted on a website is sufficient to meet
the publicity requirements. Moreover, a private fact concerns the
private matter, as opposed to a public fact, of an individual, and does
not entail information that is already known or easily ascertainable in
the public marketplace. Element three, “highly offensive,” is defined
by the Restatement to refer to “customs of the time and place.”
Here, personal facts—such as the identify of someone with whom a
party has had sexual relations—may constitute highly offensive
information. Lastly, the Restatement requires the matter not be one
in which the public has a “proper interest” in discovering.

V. Duty Owed to Third Parties
154
In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, Chief Judge Cardozo set
forth the element of duty as being a relational concept by explaining:

The conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its
relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in
its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively
to her it was not negligence at all. Nothing in the situation
gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency
of peril to persons thus removed. Negligence is not
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652D (1977).
152. See Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s Disclosure Tort: An Exploration
of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, fn. 38 (1996) (citing forty-one states that
parallel the Restatement’s elements for the public disclosure tort).
153. § 652D, cmt. A.
154. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
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actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally
protected interest, the violation of a right. Proof of
155
negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.
By way of an example:
Suppose A engages in an activity that results in foreseeable
harm to B. Because the harm was foreseeable, A had it within
his power to avoid causing it; even if there were no
precautions he could have taken to reduce the risk, he could
have forgone the activity altogether. He thus had a certain
measure of control over the situation, and . . . it seems
reasonable to ascribe to him a special responsibility for the
156
outcome that, in general, other persons do not have.
In recent history, victims of drunk drivers have been able to
successfully file suit against the establishments that provided the
157
driver with the alcohol that caused the accident. Georgia’s dram
shop law states: “the victims of these crashes can sue if bar staff serves
a noticeably intoxicated person who they know will soon be
158
What is the difference between an intoxicated person
driving.”
behind the wheel of a vehicle and a person online posting injurious
conduct? Focusing on the end result—nothing. The victim of the
drunk driver is either permanently injured or killed as a result. The
victim of the online injurious content is either permanently injured or
159
believes there is no other option than to take their own life.
The thrust of any dram shop law 160 is that a provider of alcohol has
the ability to observe the nature of individual consuming alcohol

155. Id.
156. Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 57, 72 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
157. Craig Schneider, Crash Victims Can Sue Taversn, ATL. J-CONST. (Aug. 31, 2012,
7:33
pm),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/crime-law/wrong-way-crash-raises-liabilityquestions /nRSDC/.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., A.O. Scott, Behind Every Harassed Child? A Whole Lot of Clueless
Adults, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, C10, available at http://movies.nytimes.
com/2012/03/30/movies/bully-a-documentary-by-lee-hirsch.html?_r=0 (providing review of
the movie Bully). While the Author notes physical bullying is not the functional
equivalent of online bullying—as a result of the missing physical contact—as online
interactions increase, has the time come to treat an individual’s online “space” the same as
the individual’s physical “space”?
160. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-40 (2012). Georgia’s Dram Shop Act takes a position
against the common law by imposing liability to providers of alcohol where injury results
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before they are provided with another drink. Again, this is not much
different than a web host’s ability to review the content that is posted
online. As a private actor, a web host is able to review—and censor if
161
necessary—speech before it is published. As the effects of online
speech cannot be erased by simply removing the harmful content,
reviewing the speech for content that has the intended effect of
harming a third party appears to be a necessity in the fight against
online injurious speech.

VI. Conclusion
The Internet and social media are now integral parts of everyday
life, and the growth of each in recent history has been nothing less
than explosive. Along with the increased use and accessibility comes
the possibility of abuse and a marked increase in its harmful effects.
Mainly, cyberbullying has become so prevalent in our society that the
time has come to place some responsibility on the web host. Just as
162
the publisher can be held liable for publishing defamatory material,
the web host should be liable for doing the same because “[e]veryone
owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that
163
may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.”

to a third person, and the acting causing the harm was either under the age of twenty-one
and was provided with alcohol or was provided with alcohol when in a noticeably
intoxicated state. See id.
161. But see 4 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*151–52 (“[T]he liberty of the press is, indeed, essential to the nature of free state; but this
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication, and not in freedom from censure
for criminal matter when published.”).
162. E.g., Lilian Edwards, Defamation and the Internet: Name-calling in Cyberspace, in
LAW & THE INTERNET: REGULATING CYBERSPACE 183 (Lillian Edwards & Charlotte
Waelde eds., 1997) (asserting that “users of the Internet are more likely than ordinary
citizens to be found publishing comments which are actionable as defamatory”). See
generally Gary L. Gassman, Internet Defamation: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace and the Public
Figure Doctrine, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 563 (1996).
163. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).

